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Abstract Consumer empowerment and protection are frequently discussed in 
contemporary energy policy debates. The process of consumer empowerment through 
information and consumer education has great potential, yet consumer switching as the 
concomitant outcome of this process remains low. Additional protection for vulnerable 
consumers is called for. This article is centred on the path to achieving consumer 
empowerment and protection. In particular, it stresses that empowerment should be 
viewed as a long-term process. Regulators should not focus on the mere outcome of 
switching and adopt remedies aimed at changing consumer behaviour in the short-term. 
The discussion highlights how attempts to protect vulnerable consumers through an 
ancillary application of competition law distort the competitive process and should be 
avoided. Personal vulnerabilities, such as low income, can be better tackled with 
targeted social policy measures, whereas instances of vulnerabilities pertaining to the 
market context, such as difficulties in assessing different energy offers, are better 
phased out through the market mechanism. 
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Consumer empowerment forms a leading slogan in contemporary EU policy discourses 
(Commission 2007; Commission 2011a; Commission 2011b; Commission 2012a), 
including energy market liberalization (Commission 2015a; Commission 2015b). This 
is reflected in the construction of a “New Deal” for consumers, as part of the promotion 
of an integrated energy market (Commission 2015b), and is explicit in the proposed 
lengthy and detailed regulatory framework for a “consumer centred clean energy 
transition” comprising, in essence, the Fourth Energy Package (Winter Package).2  
To this end, the European Commission (Commission) has proposed a wide 
range of different measures empowering consumers to act (Commission 2015b). These 
measures centre around the provision of information and include mechanisms for more 
accurate metering and billing and improved access to energy consumption data. The 
roll out of smart meters is seen as instrumental in that regard. Smart meters measure 
energy consumption accurately and provide more information than conventional 
meters. They can transmit and receive data for information and monitoring purposes 
using electronic communication (Commission 2016f, Article 2(18)). In addition, the 
Commission wants to educate consumers on the possibility of switching and make 
switching easier by reducing the burden and time involved and improving comparison 
tools (Commission 2015b, pp. 3-5). Empowering consumers, which encompasses 
attempts to enlist them as active market participants through the provision of 
information (process) and the concomitant triggering of consumer switching 
(outcome), can be seen as a partial solution to delivering better performing retail energy 
markets. A short-term approach to consumer empowerment focuses only on switching 
as a measurable outcome. 
At the same time, the Commission emphasises the importance of full consumer 
protection and catering for vulnerable consumers and energy poverty, and whereas this 
falls under the remit of individual Member States, the Commission accepts that 
common minimum criteria may be considered (Commission 2015b, pp. 7). It should be 
mentioned at this junction that the causes of consumer vulnerabilities are multiple and 
                                                        
2  The material is available at <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/commission-proposes-new-rules-
consumer-centred-clean-energy-transition> (accessed 6 March 2017).  
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comprise both personal and market vulnerabilities. Elderly people, people on low 
income or with disabilities suffer from personal vulnerabilities and energy poverty 
presents an example of personal vulnerability linked to low income. Market 
vulnerabilities are linked to the inability to process the relevant information because of 
reasons pertaining to the specific market context. For example, in liberalised retail 
energy markets consumers may find it difficult to evaluate different offers, because of 
their respective complex structure.  
Against this backdrop, this article focuses on the interplay between 
empowerment and protection and adopts a pragmatic approach. It does not challenge 
the liberalisation paradigm nor does it aim at formulating an alternative normative 
policy proposal. This is not to suggest that it is not worth pondering about the risks of 
this market-driven approach (Bartl 2015). Instead, this article attempts to provide a 
pragmatic exposition of how the existing paradigm can work better. There is a problem 
with the existing approach – not because of the proposed measures conferring more 
information to consumers expecting active consumer behaviour – but rather because of 
the lack of proper debate in relation to the possible impact of such measures. The 
assumption is that consumers will act upon the information provided thereby triggering 
competition between different providers. But what happens when consumers do not 
take any action? Does that suggest that the market is failing? What are the reasons for 
such inactivity?  
Over-reliance on consumer switching as the means to pursue and trigger 
competition in retail energy markets is misplaced, since consumer inactivity is not 
always an indicator of a problem requiring regulatory intervention. Yet, it may be a 
sign that certain categories of vulnerable consumers are excluded from reaping the 
benefits of liberalised retail energy markets and for those categories additional 
protection is needed. The way national regulatory and competition authorities strike 
this balance has an impact on the functioning of retail energy markets, especially given 
their highly politicised nature that may trigger political intervention, which then in turn 
adversely impacts the competitive process. Therefore, the Commission approach in 
relation to empowering consumers through specific measures (empowerment as a 
process) is a step in the right direction, but may take time to materialise and result in 
high switching level (empowerment as an outcome).  
Embarking from the Commission’s approach to empowering consumers while 
guaranteeing protection for the vulnerable, this article argues that empowerment should 
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be seen as a long-term process that is worth nourishing. The Commission and national 
regulatory authorities should focus on measures to improve the empowerment process 
and not equate empowerment with the mere act of switching between different energy 
suppliers. Focusing on empowerment as a process calls for improving access to 
information and consumers’ ability to assess it and does not necessarily lead to tangible 
results in the short term, absent switching. The fact that consumers do not switch may 
indicate a problem with empowerment as a process, it may suggest that consumer 
education takes time to materialize or equally it may represent a conscious consumer 
choice. Examining all these scenarios and the potential of empowerment as a process 
will prevent misperceived regulatory interventions and aid the phasing out of certain 
vulnerabilities pertaining to the market context.  Measures providing more information 
to consumers in order to trigger active consumer behaviour, as per the Commission 
proposals, need time to materialise. This is linked first to the nature of empowerment, 
which is very difficult to measure as psychology, behavioural economics and marketing 
literature suggests. Second, the fact that consumers do not actively switch does not 
necessarily suggest that they are not empowered. Inactivity may well represent a 
deliberate choice after careful evaluation of all available information. Third, retail 
energy markets – given their politicised nature and the importance of energy for 
consumers – may invite short-term political intervention not allowing sufficient time to 
measures triggering switching to materialise.  
Hence, this article employs three main reasons to support a long-term approach 
to the process of empowerment, which are linked to the nature of empowerment, the 
actors and the market context, and is structured as follows. Section II maps out the role 
of consumers in the context of EU energy policy debates. Section III builds on theories 
of empowerment in psychology, marketing studies and behavioural economics and 
distinguishes between measures advancing empowerment and their respective results. 
Section IV focuses on the role of consumers in competitive markets post liberalisation 
and discusses the key characteristics of multiple consumer images. Section V examines 
the ‘inherently flawed’ nature of retail energy markets. The UK retail energy market 
serves as an example to highlight the complexities and provide a pragmatic exposition 
of the preceding theoretical analysis, which alludes to different mismatches and 
paradoxes.   
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EU Energy Policy: Delivering For Consumers? 
The article’s focus on the process of consumer empowerment rather than the act of 
switching needs to be understood against the backdrop of the EU approach to the role 
of consumers in liberalised energy markets. This section critically discusses the relevant 
legislative framework, its evolution and current marked focus on promoting 
empowerment while at the same time catering for the needs of vulnerable consumers 
through specific measures.   
EU Internal Energy Market and Consumers: The Framework 
 
The adoption of EU energy legislation is a difficult exercise in balancing various 
Member States’ interests and the EU striving to achieve open and competitive markets. 
This balancing is encapsulated in the notion of services of general economic interest 
(SGEI). Despite the elusive and constantly evolving scope (Commission 2003, 
Commission 2012b), SGEI comprise the provision of services that are so important that 
the market alone cannot provide for them (Commission 2011c).  Therefore, public 
intervention is required. The supply of energy constitutes a SGEI (Case C-393/92, paras 
46-48; Case C-159/94, para 57) allowing Member States to derogate from the 
competition law provisions by virtue of Article 106(2) TFEU. This primary Treaty rule 
derogation is further developed in the secondary energy legislation discussing public 
service obligations (such as security of supply, regularity, quality and price) (Directive 
2009/73/EC, Article 3(2); Directive 2009/72/EC, Article 3(2). Similar provisions 
featured in the First and Second Electricity and Gas Directives. Directive 96/92/EC, 
Article 3(2); Directive 98/30/EC, Article 3(2). Directive 2003/54/EC, Article 3(2). 
Directive 2003/55/EC, Article 3(2)) and universal service obligations for the supply of 
electricity, of a certain quality and price, as well as  the possible appointment of a 
supplier of last resort (Directive 2009/72/EC, Article3(3)).  
Member States may also provide protection from disconnection, adopt 
measures for the alleviation of energy poverty, provide for social security benefits and 
adopt measures to improve energy efficiency (Directive 2009/73/EC, Articles 3(3)-(4); 
Directive 2009/72/EC, Article 3(7)-(8)). Increased focus is placed on the protection of 
vulnerable consumers, as each Member State is required to define the concept of 
vulnerable customers and ensure that rights and obligations linked to them are applied 
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(Directive 2009/72/EC, Article 3(7); Directive 2003/54/EC, Article 3 (5); Directive 
2003/55/EC, Article 3(3); Directive 2009/73/EC; Article 3(3)).  
The progressive liberalisation of energy markets in the EU follows a well-
known pattern predicated on the assumption that liberalised energy markets will deliver 
the most and safeguard the interests of consumers (Johnston 2016, pp. 93). Consumer 
active participation in markets corresponds to this liberal paradigm and is progressively 
strengthened. Energy market liberalisation has been incremental and faced three main 
legislative stages to date. The First Energy Package comprised primarily Directive 
96/92EC and Directive 98/30/EC. The Second Energy Package repealed these 
Directives on electricity and gas and also contained legislation improving cross border 
electricity exchanges (amongst others) (Directive 2003/54/EC; Directive 2003/55/EC; 
Regulation 1228/2003/EC). The Third Energy Package repealed the Directives on the 
internal market in electricity and gas, the cross border Regulation and the Regulation 
on access to gas transmission networks. It also established the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) (Directive 2009/72/EC; Directive 
2009/73/EC; Regulation (EC) No 714/2009; Regulation (EC) No 715/2009; Regulation 
(EC) No 713/2009).  
Improving consumer protection was one of the drivers behind the Third Energy 
Package at EU level, which is reflected in the enhanced measures adopted to that end 
(Johnston and Block 2012, pp. 162). The Third Electricity and Gas Directives 
strengthened Member States’ obligation to ensure that consumers have all of the 
necessary data (Directive 2009/72/EC, Article 3(16), Annex I, para 1(h) and (i); 
Directive 2009/73/EC, Article 3(6) and Annex I). The provision of information on their 
consumption data together with the introduction of smart meters (Directive 
2009/72/EC, Annex 1 para 2) is expected to assist consumer participation. Finally, these 
Directives have sought to improve dispute resolution and complaints handling 
(Directive 2009/72/EC, Article 3 (12)-(13); Directive 2009/73/EC, Art 3(9); Directive 
2012/27/EU, Articles 9-11).  The above measures suggest a shift towards increased 
consumer participation and empowerment but coupled with increased protection for 
vulnerable consumers. Τhe Vulnerable Consumer Working Group was established in 
order to support the implementation of the Third Energy Package (Vulnerable 
Consumer Working Group, pp. 7). 
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Commission’s New Proposals  
 
On 30th November 2016 the Commission published its Winter Package premised on 
three main goals: putting “energy efficiency first”, the EU becoming the global leader 
in renewables, and achieving a fair deal for consumers (Lavrijssen 2017). The proposed 
recast of the Electricity Directive has a dedicated chapter on consumer empowerment 
and protection and includes proposals to improve active consumer participation while 
protecting the most vulnerable consumers and consumers suffering from energy 
poverty (Commission 2016f). 
These proposals include basic contractual rights and dynamic price contracts,  
which effectively allow consumers to better control their electricity consumption 
responding to real time price signals (Commission 2016f, Articles 2(11),10-11), 
switching rights (Commission 2016f, Article 12) including switching within three 
weeks without any charge, access to price comparison tools (Commission 2016f, 
Article14), safeguarding the rights of “active customers” (Commission 2016f, Article 
15), which are defined as those “who consume, store or sell electricity generated on 
their premises, including through aggregators, or participate in demand response or 
energy efficiency schemes provided that these activities do not constitute their primary 
commercial or professional activity” (Commission 2016(f), Article 2(6)). The 
proposals also include adhering to minimum requirements for billing information 
(Commission 2016f, Article 18), introducing smart meters where possible 
(Commission 2016f, Articles 19-21) and accurately measuring actual consumption, 
even for customers on conventional meters (Commission 2016f , Article 22). A 
conventional meter, contrary to a smart meter, does not have the capability to transmit 
and receive data (Commission 2016f, Article 2 (17)).  
These proposals appear to enhance the process of consumer empowerment by 
focusing on the realisation of consumer active participation in the market as well as on 
improving electricity self-generation (Commission 2016f, paras. 25, 29). In the same 
vein, the recast Renewable Energy Directive contains provisions that incentivise 
consumers to generate, self-consume and sell electricity and generally actively 
participate in the market (Commission 2016c, Articles 21 and 22). 
In terms of consumer protection measures and protecting vulnerable and poor 
consumers, the recast Electricity Directive suggests that Member States should only 
resort to price regulation in exceptional circumstances (Commission 2016f, recital 14; 
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Article 5(2)-(4)). Alongside the provision for vulnerable consumers (Commission 
2016f, Article 28), Member States must also define a list of indicators for measuring 
energy poverty, monitor households in energy poverty and report on relevant measures 
to the Commission every two years (Commission 2016f, Article 29). 
Apart from the recast Electricity Directive, the Commission has proposed 
changes to the Energy Efficiency Directive in a bid to further empower and protect 
vulnerable consumers (Commission 2016a). These changes include improvements on 
the provision of information about energy consumption, accurate metering and billing 
and access to the respective information (Commission 2016a, Articles 7a – 11a). In 
regard to addressing energy poverty, the amended Energy Efficiency Directive 
encourages Member States to take energy poverty into account when devising energy 
efficiency obligation schemes (Commission 2016a, Articles 7a, para. 5) and alternative 
measures to achieve energy savings (Commission 2016a, Articles 7b, para. 2). 
Furthermore, the amended Directive on the Energy Performance of Buildings includes 
provisions for investments in energy efficient housing that will help tackle energy 
poverty (Commission 2016b).  
Overall, the focus on further empowering all consumers and protecting 
vulnerable consumers is echoed throughout the proposals and policy documents, and 
while the Commission acknowledges that the measures introduced in the Third Energy 
Package have enhanced consumers’ role in energy markets, its hope is that these new 
proposals can improve consumers’ position further (Commission 2016f, pp. 13). 
 Assessing the EU framework  
 
Despite efforts to increase consumer empowerment in the Third Energy Package, 
consumers remain insufficiently informed and fail to actively participate in energy 
markets (Commission 2016j).  Hence, the measures proposed in the new Commission’s 
package focus on better provision of information through more accurate billing 
information, access to price comparison websites and smart meters, facilitating 
switching, and incentivising self-generation. Such proposals follow the traditional 
approach according to which consumers as rational market actors are active in the 
market, triggering competition between suppliers and lowering energy prices.  
However, empirical evidence indicate low levels of consumer activity. The 
average EU provider switching rate is around 12% (ranging from 3% to 25% in 
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individual Member States), increasing to an average of 24%, if tariff switching with the 
current provider is taken into account (as switching is possible between offers from 
competing suppliers as well as between offers from the same supplier) with the UK 
exhibiting high switching rates compared to other Member States (Commission 2016h). 
Despite doubling in the last six years EU switching rates remain quite low. Consumers’ 
lack of switching can be partly explained by the existence of end-user price regulation 
in many Member States (14 Member States for electricity and 13 Member States for 
gas) (ACCER/CEER 2015). The ACER/CEER Market Monitoring Report 2015 
indicates a moderate increase in switching rates, with overall levels remaining quite 
low (ACER/CEER 2016b). The last consumer scoreboard has also underlined the 
various difficulties with consumer switching in retail energy markets (Commission 
2016i). Despite a record low in wholesale energy prices in 2016, retail energy prices 
have risen, pointing towards the need to further improve competition in retail markets 
(Commission 2016d, pp. 19-20). Measures to increase consumer switching have been 
moderately successful with the Commission focusing its efforts on introducing further 
improvements. In conjunction with measures triggering consumer engagement, the 
Commission Package includes measures to protect vulnerable consumers and there is a 
clear focus on tackling energy poverty. Generally, in regard to protecting the 
vulnerable, the Commission takes a clear stance against retail price regulation, while 
acknowledging the potential need for transitory social tariffs (Commission 2016j). 
Many Member States provide for a certain degree of protection for vulnerable 
consumers. Non-economic support includes protection from disconnection (Johnston 
and Block 2012, para. 7.91). A recent report on energy poverty and vulnerable 
consumers concluded that across Member States a wide range of measures have been 
adopted to tackle consumer vulnerabilities and energy poverty (INSIGHT_E 2015, pp. 
vii). The report identifies some key measures to protect vulnerable consumers. First, 
this can be achieved through targeted financial interventions through the social welfare 
system. It can also be promoted through more specific instruments, namely protection 
from disconnection, billing information, codes of conduct, debt protection, 
campaigning and smart meters. In addition, another option would be to support targeted 
energy efficiency measures, such as energy efficient refurbishments (INSIGHT_E 
2015, pp. vi-viii). 
 The rules proposed by the Commission are a step in the right direction in 
principle. The Commission’ proposals aim to enhance the process of empowerment 
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through the provision of information and even if switching levels (as the desired 
outcome) are not high, evidence suggests that the situation is improving (ACER/CEER 
2016b). Hence, this situation supports the focus on empowerment as a long-term 
process.  At the same time, these proposals call upon Member States to deliver full 
protection for the vulnerable, yet the focus is on energy poverty. The Commission 
proposals appear to draw a distinction between market based solutions premised on the 
provision of information to consumers and more protective regulatory measures for 
certain consumer categories. The concomitant question, which is unclear in the 
Commission’s Winter Package, is the extent to which the measures to increase 
empowerment also have the potential to cater for market-based vulnerabilities, such as 
consumers’ inability to assess complex information. The way different Member States 
deal with such market based vulnerabilities may have an adverse impact on the 
competitive process as the UK example suggests and as such they should steer away 








Consumer Empowerment as a Process 
As the previous discussion showed, central to the EU legislative framework on energy 
market liberalisation are tools to empower and protect consumers. The Commission 
defined empowered consumers as those able to “make optimal decisions by 
understanding their own preferences and the choices available to them. They know their 
rights, recognise when these have been breached and if so, complain and seek redress 
when necessary” (Commission 2011b). The process of consumer empowerment is thus 
premised on information and the exercise of consumer choice complemented by the 
necessary tools of redress, if consumer rights have been breached. The approach to 
consumer empowerment under EU law corresponds to what Micklitz has termed 
“access justice”, namely the mechanisms allowing consumers to participate in markets 
(access to markets) as well as the instruments allowing them to enforce their rights 
(access to justice) (2011, pp. 21-23). Consumer empowerment encapsulates both the 
process of information disclosure as well as the outcome of acting upon such 
information. Absent the latter, the provision of information (process of empowerment) 
is criticised for failing to cater for consumers’ needs. This section argues that in 
instances where evidence of consumer behaviour is low, regulators should first focus 
on improving the different stages of the process, while acknowledging the difficulties 
in measuring empowerment, and as a second step complement the information 
paradigm with regulatory measures. 
In order to sustain the need to improve the process of empowerment, rather than 
focusing on outcomes, the analysis in this section explores the cross-disciplinary nature 
of empowerment. Empowerment as a concept is explored from different perspectives 
in many disciplines. This article looks first into psychology and marketing literature, in 
a bid to show that empowerment is multifaceted and is understood mainly as the process 
and the way people interact with their environment. Hence, for the purposes of this 
article, which focuses on consumer empowerment, and argues that regulators should 
primarily focus on improving the process of empowerment, it is important that other 
disciplines provide evidence that support the focus on the process.  
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Second, this article draws from behavioural economics in order to allude to the 
limits and shortcomings of the empowerment process. Behavioural economics point to 
limits in rationality and the ability of consumers to evaluate their interests due to various 
cognitive limitations and behavioural biases.  However, insights from behavioural 
economics, instead of challenging the idea of consumer empowerment as an aid to the 
competitive discipline, should be used in order to improve the empowerment process 
and progressively phase out these biases, at least in relation to some consumer groups, 
through consumer education. 
According to Perkins and Zimmerman empowerment is an open-ended term and 
“definitions of empowerment abound” (Perkins and Zimmerman 1995, pp. 570). They 
offered a concise account of the relevant psychology literature, highlighting the 
identification of capabilities and pointing to empowerment both as a process and an 
outcome, which permits the study of the consequences of the relevant empowerment 
processes (Perkins and Zimmerman 1995). Zimmerman’s research on psychological 
empowerment (distinct from organizational or community empowerment) suggested 
that the development of a universal and global measure of empowerment is neither 
feasible nor desirable (Zimmerman 1995). 
 Our discussion here focuses on a different construction of empowerment, 
namely consumer empowerment; nonetheless interesting analogies can be drawn with 
Zimmerman’s findings on psychological empowerment defined as “empowerment at 
the individual level of analysis [integrating] perceptions of personal control, a proactive 
approach to life and a critical understanding of the sociopolitical environment” (1995, 
pp. 581). Zimmerman constructed a “nomological network of psychological 
empowerment” comprising an intrapersonal, interactional and behavioural component 
(1995, pp. 588). The intrapersonal component refers to people’s perception of 
themselves and their skills; the interactional component refers to people’s 
understanding of their environment and the behavioural component refers to 
empowerment actions taken to influence outcomes (Zimmerman 1995). Similarly, 
consumer empowerment encapsulates both consumer capabilities and the respective 
interaction with their market environment, implicitly adopting the intrapersonal, 
interactional and behavioural components. Since the outcome of empowerment is 
difficult to measure and is influenced by many different variables, the focus should lie 
on measuring different indicators pertaining to the process.  
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 The understanding of empowerment as a process is also supported by the 
marketing literature. Denegri-Knott et al. (2006), in their study on synthesising various 
theories on consumer empowerment, presented three dominant models (Nardo et al 
2011). The consumer sovereignty model, premised on the rational consumer, focuses 
on consumers’ abilities as well as their actions in defence of their rights, which can alter 
suppliers’ behaviour. The cultural model, premised on conflict – the interaction 
between consumers and markets - focuses on different consumer strategies of resistance 
to market forces. The discursive model is not premised on a conflict between consumers 
and markets but rather on a symbiotic interaction. The above succinct presentation of 
these three models of consumer empowerment suggests that these models have in 
common the exploration of the interplay between consumers and markets and a focus 
(albeit with different intensities) on improving consumers’ skills (process) and the 
various outcomes in the form of consumer active behaviour, either individually or 
collectively.  
Both the marketing and behavioural economics literature have highlighted the 
difficulties in devising a workable process of empowerment. Shankar, Cherrier and 
Canniford employed a Foucauldian approach to suggest that more choice may lead to 
“choice paralysis” (2006), while behavioural economics challenges the assumption that 
consumers are rational decision makers and suggest that they are constrained by a 
number of biases (Behavioural Insights Team 2016; OFT 1224; OFT 1324; Stucke 
2007), which limit their ability to act upon the information given.  Regulators suggest 
that consumers should have access to information, and the ability to assess it and act 
upon it (OFT 1224, pp. 10-11; Ofgem 2011; OFT, Ofgem and CMA 2014, para 3.1; 
CC3, para 296). Yet, consumer behavioural biases are present at all different stages of 
the decision making process. These biases are linked to both the quality and quantity 
of information. For example, framing bias suggests that the way a certain situation is 
presented may induce consumers to act accordingly (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). In 
addition, consumers may choose not to act because of loss aversion and status quo bias, 
according to which people are more concerned about losing rather than gaining 
something and are likely to retain the status quo and prefer the default option (Stucke 
2007, pp. 527-528).  
 Related to this is the question of what is the ‘right’ amount of information as 
too much information may induce consumers to make the wrong choices. According to 
quantitative studies, lower switching rates are observed when consumers are presented 
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with more options (Wilson and Waddams Price 2005). Therefore, the question arises 
as to whether the provision of more information facilitates the exercise of choice as 
more information may result in confusion, creating the so-called confusopoly problem 
(Mehta and R. Sugden 2013, pp. 41). The existence of such biases can be exploited by 
energy suppliers and impact on consumers’ search and switching costs, thereby 
preventing the realisation of consumer empowerment. The focus should be on how to 
address these biases while taking into account the impact of the adopted remedies on 
the competitive process. In addition, remedies should account for the fact that non-
switching cannot always be attributed to consumers’ behavioural biases; it may be a 
balanced choice to remain with their supplier.  
As pointed out in the ACER/CEER Market Monitoring Report  “when assessing 
competition using switching rates, it is also important to consider the reasons for not 
switching” (2015, pp. 69). Crampes and Waddams identify four main reasons for 
consumers’ inactivity: insufficient (actual or anticipated) gains, lack of trust in new 
suppliers, complexity of the switching process and loyalty to the existing supplier 
(2017, pp. 9-14).  All these reasons can be indicative of different failures in the process 
of empowerment, first in the provision of information/ access, as well as in the ability 
to assess such information. Here policy makers can play an important role with targeted 
campaigns informing consumers about the benefits of switching and the options 
available (Crampes and Waddams 2017, pp. 10, 20). However, consumers’ inactivity 
may represent a rational choice not to switch after having compared the prices of 
different providers or the fact that they value the good quality of the service provided 
(passive engagement – no action). For example, loyalty to existing suppliers may be 
attributed to consumers’ status quo bias or to consumers’ satisfaction with the current 
supplier. Such inactivity may also be read as a sign of resistance to market forces 
pertaining to the cultural model of consumer empowerment in the marketing literature.  
Active engagement is the most complete type of empowerment and leads to 
measurable outcomes, since the active-engaged consumer group has access to, assesses 
and acts upon the information. Passive engagement lacks the latter element, as 
consumers consciously choose not to act on the information for a number of reasons 
such as, for example, satisfaction with their current supplier (ACER/CEER 2015, pp. 
97). Sophisticated and rich consumers may, thus, fall within the passive-engaged 
consumer group. On the contrary, disengagement is different to passive engagement, as 
it encapsulates instances where consumers fail to either access, assess and act upon the 
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information due to many different reasons corresponding to different causes of 
vulnerability.  
In sum, different approaches to empowerment in psychology, marketing and 
behavioural economics suggest that the focus should be on the process of improving 
consumer skills and addressing consumers’ often inherent inability to participate as 
actors in retail energy markets. At the same time, one should be cautious as instances 
of consumers’ passive behaviour cannot necessarily be equated with a failure of the 




Consumers as Market Actors: Multiple Consumer Images 
The above analysis on the process of empowerment suggests that consumers may 
participate in markets with different levels of intensity. Consumers can be placed on a 
spectrum comprising empowered consumers, i.e. active engaged consumers and 
passive engaged consumers, as well as disengaged consumers. The emphasis is on 
empowered active consumers as a trigger to the competitive process (OFT 1224, pp. 
18; CC3, para 295). Passive engaged and disengaged consumers have in common their 
inactivity, i.e. the fact that they do not switch between different suppliers. Nonetheless, 
passive engaged consumers have the ability to access and assess the information and 
their lack of action is a conscious choice and should not be equated with vulnerability. 
An emerging paradigm of multiple consumer images is observed (Lavrijssen 2014). 
Despite overlaps between the different groups, all of these images are present in energy 
policy debates and influence the adoption of different remedies to empower and protect 
consumers. 
 The concept of the empowered consumer finds its expression in EU consumer 
law in the concept of the average consumer, who is defined as “well informed and 
reasonably observant and circumspect” (Case C-210/96, para. 31; Directive 
2005/29/EC, recital 18). As such, the model of average consumer is based on the 
provision of information and has been criticised for the restrictive assumptions at its 
base, since consumers often fail to measure up to the rational consumer model 
(European Consumer Consultative Group 2013, pp.8; Howells and Wilhelmsson 2003; 
Stuyck 2014). The image of the average consumer formulated by the European Court 
of Justice has strengthened the internal market to the detriment of more protective 
national measures (Mak 2011, pp. 29). It has been occasionally complemented by other 
consumer models, where the Court or EU legislature felt that consumers were not 
corresponding to the average consumer model and stricter consumer protection rules 
were needed (Case C-382/87; Regulation (EU) No 254/2014; Parliament 2011; 
European Consumer Consultative Group 2013). Alongside the average consumer, the 
notion of “vulnerable consumer” had entered EU law (Reich 2016, pp. 139), albeit in a 
fragmented manner. An example here can be drawn from the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive, which in Article 5(3) refers to the “average vulnerable consumer” 
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by reference to “[…]a clearly identifiable group of consumers who are particularly 
vulnerable to the practice or the underlying product because of their mental or physical 
infirmity, age or credulity” (Directive 2005/29/EC).  
In the same manner that the average consumer model allows for market 
deregulation, since there is no need for protection through consumer law measures, the 
notion of the empowered consumer as a trigger to competition calls for less regulatory 
intervention and puts an increased onus on consumers. Consumers are empowered 
through the provision of information and the exercise of choice, which in turn 
disciplines market players.  The active empowered consumer is the model consumer in 
retail energy markets. Passive consumers complicate intervention as it is difficult to 
distinguish the various reasons behind this inactivity and calls for more cautious 
regulatory interventions based on a better understanding of consumer behaviour (Flores 
and Waddams Price 2013). The process of empowerment can improve access and the 
ability to assess, but cannot guarantee a given positive outcome, in this case switching.  
An important factor in driving consumer behaviour is confidence in the process and the 
resulting gains from switching (Deller et al 2014, pp. 23; Waddams Price et al 2013, 
pp. 7; Waddams Price and Zhu 2016). However, switching does not guarantee the 
cheapest deal, which undermines market confidence and acts as a disincentive to 
consumer engagement (Wilson and Waddams Price 2010). Such wrong switching 
decisions can have a chilling effect on consumer activity resulting in less engagement. 
 The inactivity is the link between the passive empowered consumer group and 
the vulnerable consumer group, which is by no means homogeneous. The fact that some 
consumers remain passive does not mean that they are not empowered. Yet at the same 
time it may be taken as an indicator of consumer vulnerabilities, which can be linked 
to personal attributes or the specific market context (Commission 2016g). The 
Commission recognised that vulnerability is not a static situation and refers to both 
consumers’ personal characteristics and capabilities as well as the context of market 
transactions (Commission 2016g, pp. xviii). Both personal and market vulnerabilities 
may exacerbate consumer biases and tamper with their ability to engage and exercise 
empowerment.   
Vulnerabilities can be personal or market related and have attracted the attention 
of national regulators (FCA 2013; Ofgem 2013), who stress that everyone can be 
potentially vulnerable (FCA 2013, pp. 8). The distinction between personal and market 
vulnerabilities corresponds to Reich’s tripartite analysis of vulnerabilities between 
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physical disability, intellectual disability and economic disability (Reich 2016, pp. 
141). Personal vulnerabilities comprise physical and economic disabilities, whereas 
market related vulnerabilities correspond to intellectual disabilities relating to various 
difficulties in exercising consumer choice. The UK energy regulator – the Office of Gas 
and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) - discusses both the personal circumstances and the 
respective market context in its approach to consumer vulnerabilities (Ofgem 2013). 
Personal circumstances include, for example, age, disabilities, sickness and low income 
(Ofgem 2013, paras 3.10-3.11). Energy poverty linked to low income is an example of 
personal vulnerability, and is generally defined as the inability of consumers to heat 
their homes or enjoy other energy services at an affordable cost (INSIGHT_E 2015, pp. 
v; Trinomics 2016). One indicator is expenditure on energy compared to household 
income. This may vary in different Member States. In the UK, a household is 
considered to be fuel poor if 10 per cent. of its income is spent on fuel in order to heat 
at an adequate level (DECC 2013, pp. 8). The Commission has calculated that the 
lowest income households in the EU spend approximately 9% of their income on 
energy, 50% more than what they were paying 10 years ago (Commission 2016e, pp. 
11). Affordability is thus one expression of consumer vulnerabilities, which are more 
complex and multi-dimensional (Crampes and Waddams 2017, pp. 8, 15). 
Consumers’ inability to process complex information may be given as an 
example of vulnerability related to the specific market context. This is the area where 
the process of empowerment through the provision of information should primarily 
focus. If the provision of information together with consumer abilities and skills is 
improved, this type of market vulnerability will progressively subside. On the other 
hand, the competitive process cannot cater for personal vulnerabilities and needs to be 
complemented with additional regulatory and social measures. The focus on measures 
to tackle energy poverty reflects this approach. Such an approach draws the right 
balance between market related measures and measures protecting consumers directly 
in retail energy markets, in the light of the inherent characteristics of these markets, 





Retail Energy Markets: ‘Inherently Flawed Markets’ and the UK Example  
This section embarks on a concise exposition of the nature of retail energy markets. 
The analysis examines certain characteristics of the respective markets, namely their 
highly politicised nature, the inevitable interplay between competition and regulation 
as well as the importance of energy for consumers, and exemplifies these characteristics 
in the context of the UK retail energy markets. By using concrete examples of failed 
regulatory interventions in the UK context, the analysis ultimately reveals that a short-
term focus on consumer switching – as the outcome of the empowerment process – 
adversely impacts consumer welfare. Rather, the focus should be on the long-term 
process of empowerment and avoid short-term political interventions.  
In the UK, the short term focus on switching as the measurable outcome of the 
empowerment process resulted in wrong regulatory interventions. Here, we employ two 
examples of remedies proposed by Ofgem to exemplify this point; first, the non-
discrimination obligation imposed on electricity suppliers (preventing them from 
charging different prices in different regions) and second, the imposition of an 
obligation to simplify and limit the number of available offers.  
The UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) undertook the last review 
of the UK retail energy market. The CMA equally focused on triggering switching 
through improving consumer information as well as protecting vulnerable consumers 
through the imposition of a transitional price cap. The CMA accepts that measures to 
promote consumer engagement require time to deliver results. Yet, in the interim, the 
CMA retreated to more traditional interventionist measures.  
 
The Nature of Retail Energy Markets 
 
The nature of retail energy markets may further exacerbate consumers’ personal and 
market vulnerabilities, the former because of the essentiality of energy and the latter 
due to various complexities in evaluating different offers. Acknowledging these 
limitations aids in a refocusing of empowerment on the process rather than the outcome 
of switching and in the concomitant construction of adequate remedies to tackle 
personal vulnerabilities, primarily energy poverty.  
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 Retail energy markets present inelastic demand, regulatory intervention and a 
politicised nature in the light of their importance for consumers. Energy is essential to 
our everyday lives. It is a homogenous product, which, in light of its importance, must 
be priced at affordable levels (Bartl 2010; Deller and Waddams 2015; Pront van 
Bommel 2016). Energy markets may present high levels of concentration, vertically 
integrated firms and problems with access to distribution infrastructure, which can 
affect the levels of competition. In the light of these characteristics, energy markets can 
be seen as ‘inherently flawed’ markets.3 ‘Inherently flawed’ markets appear not to 
deliver the best offers to consumers; nonetheless, this cannot be clearly attributed to a 
competition law infringement. For example, in the context of the UK retail energy 
markets, the regulators have observed rising energy prices, an increase in the profits of 
the vertically integrated main energy suppliers and low levels of consumer trust and 
satisfaction (OFT, Ofgem and CMA 2014, paras 1.1, 1.4, 1.15, 1.16). These may have 
been indicative of serious competition law problems such as coordination between 
suppliers and preventing the expansion of smaller suppliers (OFT, Ofgem and CMA 
2014, paras 1.26-1.28, 1.36-.139). However, the CMA detailed investigation into the 
retail energy markets did not confirm these assumptions (CMA 2015, paras 69-79, 136). 
 Another way to view energy markets is as markets with “wicked problems”. 
Kolk (2012, pp.180) has described “wicked problems” as “difficult to solve, not for 
technical reasons […] but because of social complexities, including interdependencies, 
multi-causalities, divergent perceptions, involving a multitude of stakeholders, and an 
evolution in several of these aspects over time as well, with sometimes unforeseen 
consequences of measures taken”. These problems can be linked to the various images 
of consumers and the fact that the market may cater for certain groups, i.e. engaged 
consumers but not others, i.e. the disengaged.  
The competitive process does not cater for every consumer, nor does it 
necessarily guarantee ethically acceptable results (Hammond 1993, pp. 21). Whereas 
some consumers benefit from market liberalisation by shopping around and looking for 
better deals, others, for a constellation of different reasons, remain with their suppliers 
and end up paying a higher price. The concomitant question is whether and to what 
                                                        
3 Another term that has been used is “problem markets”. See the excellent presentations at the annual 
CCP conference 2014 on problem markets, available at http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/events/annual-
conferences <accessed 22 September 2016>.  
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extent it is ethically acceptable for disengaged consumers to be exploited. This is 
especially so when the disengaged consumer category comprises the most vulnerable 
consumers, such as the elderly, disabled and poor.  Competition law has inherent limits 
in catering for personal vulnerabilities and often needs to be complemented with 
regulatory measures to deliver affordable prices to certain categories of consumers. 
Such regulatory intervention may adversely impact the competitive process, as 
indicated by Ofgem’s intervention following its two reviews of the UK retail energy 
markets.  
In effect, in retail energy markets, the most appropriate reaction to an identified 
market malfunctioning is hard to identify and place within the competition law or 
regulatory realm. The application of competition law with a regulatory mindset can be 
accepted to the extent that competition and regulation share some of the same aims such 
as maximising efficiency and improving consumer choice. However, they employ 
different tools to attain these and, as Justice Breyer, eloquently stated “antitrust analysis 
must sensitively recognize and reflect the distinctive economic and legal setting of the 
regulated industry to which it applies”(Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co). 
In simple terms, competition enhances the available offers, in terms of price, 
quality and choice, thereby allowing consumers to choose between different products 
that suit their needs. Such demand side responses in turn create a virtuous circle, as the 
exercise of that choice prompts suppliers to improve in order to gain consumer trust. 
Hence, the competitive process progressively educates consumers to react to market 
signals and assess the relevant offers based on the given information and as such, 
competition law has the potential to ameliorate vulnerabilities pertaining to the market 
context. 
The relationship between competition law and regulation creates difficulties in 
situations where they pursue conflicting aims. The conflict may be internal in cases 
where both competition and regulation pursue the economic goal of efficiency 
maximisation with regulation adopting a short-term approach, or external given that 
regulation may pursue a wider range of goals ranging from economic to a diverse array 
of non-economic goals (Prosser 2010, pp. 18).  The different mandates of energy 
regulators and competition authorities reflect this diversity in goals. For example, the 
CMA is entrusted with the promotion of competition for the benefit of consumers, 
whereas Ofgem’s principal objective is to protect the interests of existing and future 
energy consumers, pursuing a range of public interest objectives such as the reduction 
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of greenhouse emissions and security of energy supply and having regard to the 
interests of vulnerable customers, such as those who are chronically sick, of 
pensionable age and on low incomes (OFT, Ofgem and CMA 2014, paras 2.4, 3.32). 
Finding a proper balance between accommodating economic and non-economic 
goals in retail energy markets is essential given the unavoidable symbiotic relationship 
between competition and regulation and the fact that the existence of different public 
interest goals, such as the protection of certain vulnerable consumers, may have 
negative spillover effects on competition.  This balance is linked to the question of the 
attribution of different responsibilities and roles between competition and energy 
regulators. As the UK example showcases, the energy regulator, Ofgem, should be 
more cognizant of the impact of regulatory remedies on the competitive process. At the 
same time, the competition regulator, the CMA, should not step into the market to 
covertly protect certain vulnerable groups. 
 
UK Retail Energy Markets: Mapping the issues 
 
The British residential gas market was fully liberalised in May 1998 with the electricity 
market following in May 1999. For the transitory period price caps were introduced, 
which were subsequently removed in April 2002 (Waddams Price 2005, pp. 132). By 
2008 following subsequent consolidations, the original incumbents (Big Six) 
represented almost all the electricity and gas markets (Hviid and Waddams Price 2012, 
pp. 239; OFT, Ofgem and CMA 2014, para 2.6). At that time, in the light of rising 
energy prices, Ofgem undertook an investigation into the liberalised energy market 
(Energy Supply Probe) (Ofgem 2010). Recognising that the energy market was not 
delivering the desired outcome for consumers and observing an increase in energy 
prices, it launched its Retail Market Review (RMR) in late 2010 (Ofgem 2010). The 
adopted regulatory remedies attracted wide criticism (Hviid and Waddams Price 2012; 
Littlechild 2012; Littlechild 2014, pp. 191; Pollitt and Haney 2014; Waddams Price and 
Zhu 2013).  This criticism was directed at Ofgem for failing to assess the impact of its 
regulatory intervention for the protection of vulnerable groups on the competitive 
process. Such intervention resulted in an adverse effect on competition, harming the 
very consumers it sought to protect. 
First, following the Energy Supply Probe, Ofgem introduced non-
discrimination obligations for energy retailers with a three-year sunset clause. These 
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obligations: (a) prevented the charging of different prices in different regions and (b) 
the discrimination between different payment methods (with the exception of 
introductory offers), the latter following EU legislation.  
In relation to regional price discrimination, before energy liberalization there 
was one electricity and gas supplier per region. After liberalization, new entrants (who 
were the main suppliers in other regions) offered lower prices in new regions in order 
to attract customers from the incumbents.  It was observed that new entrants offered 
lower prices, while the incumbents charged 10 per cent. more to their existing 
customers, thereby exploiting the loyalty of the consumers in their home markets, who 
were overall reluctant to switch to a new entrant despite the better prices offered (Hviid 
and Waddams 2012, pp. 237). One of Ofgem’s prime considerations was the fact that 
vulnerable consumers were less prone to switching and were not benefiting from better 
offers. Ofgem introduced a prohibition on price discrimination since active consumers 
switching between suppliers could not bring prices down for the inactive group, which 
comprised predominantly vulnerable consumers. Therefore, the regulator driven from 
fairness consideration and the idea that the active consumer group cannot benefit at the 
expense of the inactive group (which included primarily vulnerable consumers) stepped 
in to protect the vulnerable consumer group (Hviid and Waddams 2012, pp. 237).  
The introduction of non-discrimination obligations regarding payment methods 
also sought to favour vulnerable consumers (Hviid and Waddams 2012, pp. 244). There 
are three payment methods: standard credit by  quarterly cheque, direct debit monthly 
through standing order from the bank account and prepayment (pay-as-you-go). 
Prepayment meters are installed when customers have a poor payment record (CMA 
2015, paras 92-94). For energy suppliers, direct debit customers are preferable to the 
other two groups. Research suggests that it could be beneficial for lowering prices, if 
there is competition for direct debit customers (Hviid and Waddams 2012, pp. 248). 
Competition for direct debit customers would result in lower prices and as suppliers 
could not discriminate between direct debit, standard credit and prepayment customers, 
the latter groups would also benefit from lower prices. Unfortunately though, 
competition was undermined by the introduction of non-discrimination obligation 
between different regions, since this resulted in chilling competition and a rise in prices. 
This rise in prices affected the more vulnerable groups, since, as Ofgem pointed out, 
vulnerable consumers are less likely to switch, while active empowered consumers 
could still benefit from different offers. The introduction of regional non-discrimination 
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clauses reduced the potential gains from switching and thereby had a dampening effect 
on the switching levels, as consumers’ decisions are driven by the potential benefits 
(Waddams Price 2013, pp. 77). 
A second example of regulatory intervention that was not well thought out 
comes from Ofgem’s second review of the retail electricity markets. In the RMR, 
Ofgem introduced a simplification of tariffs (“simpler choices” component), despite 
warnings from the incumbents and new entrants about the potential detrimental effects 
on tariff innovation and customer engagement (OFT, Ofgem and CMA 2014, paras 
3.38-3.43). The “simpler choices” component included (a) a ban on complex tariffs; (b) 
a maximum limit on the number of tariffs that suppliers offer; and (c) a simplification 
of cash discounts (CMA 2016b, para 170). The simplification aimed at facilitating 
consumer switching (CMA 2016b, para 171) and was premised on behavioural 
economics claims that consumers will fail to assess information and act upon it when 
provided with too much information. After analysing the “simpler choices” element of 
the RMR rules, the CMA concluded that the simplification had the opposite result. It 
had not increased consumer engagement but rather impacted negatively on suppliers’ 
incentives to engage in innovation and also on price comparison websites’ (PCW) 
incentives to compete (CMA 2016b, paras 172-177). In effect, the chosen tariff 
simplification revealed the limits of behavioural economics informing the adoption of 
workable remedies.  Despite the importance of behavioural economics in explaining 
consumer behaviour, when they inform the structure of particular remedies, they may 
yield negative results on the competitive process.  
Against this backdrop of regulatory interventions in the retail energy markets, 
wide consumer discontent prevailed, prompting the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), the 
CMA and Ofgem to launch a joint state of the market assessment on the competition 
levels and how these were catering to the interests of consumers and small firms (OFT, 
Ofgem and CMA 2013; OFT, Ofgem and CMA 2014).  Ofgem decided to make a 
market investigation reference to the CMA under section 134 Enterprise Act 2002. The 
observed rise in domestic energy prices was the key driver behind the market 
investigation reference (CMA 2015, para 19). The documents leading to the CMA’s 
decision showcase Ofgem’s wider array of objectives and its caution with regard to 
focusing on its principal objective, to promote effective competition (Ofgem 2014, 
paras 2.3-2.4), while considering other objectives, including the interests of vulnerable 
consumers (Ofgem 2014, paras 2.3-2.4, 2.8, 2.25-2.26). On the other hand, the CMA 
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remit in the context of a market investigation consists of identifying any feature that is 
causing an adverse effect on competition (AEC) and identifying possible market 
failures either on the demand or the supply side.  In assessing whether an AEC exists, 
the CMA examines any features that may distort competition in the relevant market 
(CC3 2013, para 94).  The benchmark against which an AEC is found is that of a well-
functioning market (CC3 2013, para 30). The CMA points to the distinct characteristics 
of energy markets and acknowledges that the benchmark of a well-functioning market 
does not correspond to the ideal of a perfect market but rather to a realistic assessment 
of the market situation without the AEC.  Given the nature of retail energy markets, a 
certain degree of regulatory intervention is unavoidable (CMA 2014, para 17).  
Arguably, Ofgem’s previous involvement and the two reviews of retail energy 
markets, have influenced the following CMA market investigation (Littlechild 2015, 
pp. 591-592).  Ofgem failed to assess the impact of the proposed remedies on 
competition placing the onus on the CMA to address various problems, some of which 
possibly outside its mandate to promote competition for the benefits of consumers. The 
CMA identified weak customer engagement as one of the AECs in its investigation 
(CMA. (2016b), para 125). As such the CMA proposed remedies to promote consumer 
empowerment and active engagement. These remedies have been criticised as 
intervening in the market to prompt or “nudge” (Baldwin 2014, Thaler and Sunstein 
2003; Thaler and Sunstein 2008) consumers and trigger engagement may result in an 
interventionist approach (Littlechild 2014, pp.198). Nonetheless, it remains within the 
CMA’s remit to improve demand side responses in the context of a market 
investigation.  
However, it is less clear whether the CMA can propose remedies for the 
protection of vulnerable consumers – without distinguishing between market and 
personal vulnerabilities. For this reason, the CMA phrased the remedies that favour 
primarily vulnerable groups in terms of promoting the engagement of more disengaged 
groups (CMA 2016c, paras 9.14-9.15, 9.60). The proposed remedies though suggest 
that the CMA has taken into account the interests of vulnerable consumers directly 
(CMA 2016c, paras 12.448, 14.463, 16.12). The CMA’s decision addressed both 
personal reasons as well as market related reasons for consumers’ inactivity. In relation 
to personal attributes the CMA observed that disengaged customers present 
characteristics, such as low incomes, low qualifications, living in rented 
accommodation or aged over 65 years (CMA 2016b, para 135).  
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Following its market investigation, the CMA proposed remedies aimed at 
triggering switching and directly protecting vulnerable consumers. Apart from 
removing large elements of the “simpler choices” component, the CMA proposed an 
Ofgem led programme providing for a more evidence based intervention based on 
testing and trialing (CMA 2016b, paras 229-230; CMA 2016c para. 20.24). In addition, 
the CMA focused on “principles rather than rules” and recommended that Ofgem 
changes Standard License Condition 25C requiring that suppliers have due regard in 
the design of tariffs to customers’ ability to compare (CMA 2016a, para 98; CMA 
2016c, para 20.26).  
The remedies focused also on strengthening third party intermediaries’ role by 
removing regulatory restrictions and granting access to customers’ data (CMA 2016a, 
paras 100-105; CMA 2016c, para 20.24). These remedies included an Ofgem controlled 
database of disengaged customers (the Database Remedy), which would allow rival 
suppliers to send a letter to consumers that have remained on a Standard Variable Tariff 
(SVT), for more than three years – prompting them to switch. SVT is the tariff charged, 
where consumers do not choose a specific plan or when a fixed term non SVT expires. 
Consumers can opt out of such prompts and suppliers having access to this database 
would be subject to strict scrutiny. The CMA recognised that there is a fine balance 
between triggering customer switching and aggressive marketing practices (CMA 
2016a, paras 106-110; CMA 2016c, para 20.24). The CMA further placed a lot of hope 
in smart meters’ contribution to customer engagement and therefore has put pressure 
on suppliers to ensure the roll-out of smart meters by 2020 (failing which Ofgem would 
be expected to impose penalties) (CMA 2016a, paras 114-115; CMA 2016c, paras 208-
210).  
One of the most controversial and widely discussed remedies is the imposition 
of a transitional price cap for customers on prepayment meters for a transitional period 
(2017-2020). The CMA found that often-vulnerable consumers are on prepayment 
meters and therefore the introduction of this remedy aimed at directly protecting them. 
The CMA was cautious not to excessively intervene in the market and therefore the 
initial proposal to apply the price a cap to all SVT customers was dropped (CMA 2016a, 
paras 143-145; CMA 2016c, paras 243-244 and para. 20.24). Interestingly though, the 
competition regulator proposed a price cap aiming at directly protecting the vulnerable 
consumers, exposing the regulatory undertone of the proposed remedies. 
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UK Retail Energy Markets: Exemplifying ‘inherently flawed markets’ and implications 
for consumer empowerment and protection 
   
Time will tell whether these remedies will contribute to lower retail energy prices. 
However, we need to acknowledge the multiple variables shaping energy prices, of 
which consumer switching is only one. The ACER/CEER Reports suggest that the 
problem is not with consumer switching levels but with the weak link between 
electricity wholesale prices and the energy component of retail prices as this weak link 
may be indicative of competition problems (amongst others) (ACER/CEER 2015, pp. 
9; ACER/CEER 2016a, para 12). Even though wholesale prices decreased, there was a 
rise in retail electricity prices because of the increase in non-contestable charges 
(taxation and network charges) (ACER/ CEER 2015, para 26). At the same time, the 
UK was identified amongst the most competitive retail electricity and gas households 
market in the EU (ACER/CEER 2015, pp. 51; ACER/CEER 2016b, para 87). The 
ACER/ CEER Market Monitoring Report 2015 noted that the UK performs better on 
market structure indicators than on market conduct and competition performance 
indicators and pointed to the findings of the CMA regarding the lack of consumer 
engagement. This finding does not fit well with the findings of the Report on the 
existence of high switching rates in the UK (ACER/CEER 2016b, para 87). The ACER/ 
CEER Report also noted that UK consumer switching rates are amongst the highest in 
the EU, although the largest decrease in switching rates was observed in 2014 
(compared to 2013). It also pointed to the existence of new entrants (ACER/ CEER 
2015, pp. 62-64). 
Ofgem announced that in 2016 switching saw a six year high coupled with an 
increasing number of new suppliers (Barnes 2017). On these switching rates, Ofgem’s 
CEO Dermot Nolan commented that while these latest figures indicate good progress, 
the market is not as competitive as the regulator would have liked. This situation 
justified the introduction of the temporary price cap (Ofgem 2017). However, it is 
inherent in the nature of competitive markets that some consumers will not reap the 
benefits. High switching rates and the increase in new entrants suggest that the market 
is competitive. For certain consumer groups that do not engage with the competitive 
process and hence are unduly disadvantaged additional protection is needed, but this 
should come as a complement to the competitive process, rather than suggesting that 
the market is not competitive.  
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Overall, the experience in the UK retail energy markets suggests that in 
‘inherently flawed’ markets, regulators should be cautious regarding the appropriate 
mix of competition and regulatory remedies. Triggering consumer empowerment in 
retail energy markets is complicated by the nature of the market, which calls for a more 
process based approach and a clearer delineation between different consumer groups. 
The process based enforcement strategies rest on information disclosure and better 
consumer education. Crampes and Waddams have suggested that different information 
campaigns may be needed for different consumer groups. For example, a tailored 
campaign stressing the actual gains from switching has the potential to incentivize older 
consumers that, as evidence suggests, seem to underestimate the potential gains from 
switching (2017, pp. 20-21). Better information campaign stressing the gains from 
switching can address consumers’ perception about low gains from switching and 
incentivize more consumers to actively engage, as research shows that the anticipated 
gains are a main factor driving switching behaviour (Deller et al 2014, pp.4). Yet, non 
switching may indicate a satisfaction with the current supplier (Zhu 2013, pp. 68). 
Process based enforcement strategies call for more reliance on market forces. At the 
same time, they accept the limits of the market mechanisms in situations, where 
consumers are unable to engage with the market due to personal vulnerabilities 
pertaining to personal attributes such as age, disabilities and low income. In these cases, 
tailored measures to protect these consumer groups are needed in the short term, as 
reliance to switching to deliver lower prices is a long term process.  
The CMA’s suggested remedies were guided by a quest to protect consumer 
groups with certain characteristics, which place them in a vulnerable position, in a bid 
to motivate them to engage in the market. This is a worthy goal, yet it is unclear how 
the introduction of a price cap can assist in this direction. In addition, remedies to 
prompt switching – such as the Database Remedy - may fail to engage consumers, given 
consumers’ attitudes towards receiving ‘prompts’. Remedies to promote engagement 
need time to unravel their potential and they may fail due to the many variants driving 
consumer behaviour. In the meantime, the CMA has opted for a retreat to traditional 
intervention, introducing a price cap in order to directly protect prepayment meter 
customers, while acknowledging the tensions that such a remedy may create with the 
levels of competition and engagement and stressing that the design of this remedy will 
allow competition to co-exist (CMA 2016b, para 207).   
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In sum, the suggested approach is reliance on the process of empowerment 
coupled with targeted social policy measures. Competitive markets cannot cater for 
certain personal vulnerabilities. Regulatory measures can improve the functioning of 
markets for certain consumer groups. This is not to suggest that consumers with 
personal vulnerabilities, such as the fuel poor, do not have the ability to engage with 
the market.  For reasons of justice and fairness, they need to be supported in the interim 
with additional measures because they lack the ability to afford their energy bills. This 
approach corresponds to the “regulatory welfare state” (Haber 2011; Levi Faur 2014). 
At the same time, regulators need to be particularly cautious about the impact of the 
suggested remedies to empower and protect consumers on the competitive process, 
since as the UK experience suggests, remedies with the intention to deliver fairer 
market outcomes led to worse outcomes for all consumer groups and did not solve the 
“poor pay more” problem (Caplovitz 1967). Instead, they made it worse.   
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Conclusion 
How effective has our quest for consumer empowerment been? Could it be that a 
narrow definition of its goals and subsequently narrow measurement provide us with 
distorted outcomes? This article has advanced the claim that in retail energy markets, 
regulators should focus on empowerment as a process rather than focusing on the 
outcome of switching. After all, if empowerment is seen as the outcome of switching it 
does not accommodate the multiple consumer images, as it does not account for the 
category of passive, yet empowered consumers. As noted, empowerment as a process 
has inherent limits, as examined by the psychology, marketing and behavioural 
economics literature, since the process is linked to specific outcomes that cannot always 
be measured. Equally, when the process does not lead to the desirable outcome, in our 
case switching suppliers, one should ponder why the desired outcome has not 
materialized and may be attributed to various consumer biases. These limits can be 
overcome through consumer education, which is a time intensive process. In addition 
to the above, the nature of retail energy markets as inherently flawed calls for a 
symbiotic relationship between competition and regulation.  Allowing time for the 
process of empowerment has the potential to progressively phase out vulnerabilities 
linked to the market context. The UK example suggests that this approach is 
prophylactic to short-term political interventions in retail energy markets.  
On the contrary, if the focus is on triggering switching in the short-term, with 
an underlying rationale of protecting vulnerable groups (without clearly distinguishing 
between market and personal vulnerabilities), this will have an adverse impact on the 
competitive process and adversely affect the very consumers that it sought to protect, 
as shown by the example of the UK retail energy markets. Following two market 
reviews by Ofgem, in which it failed to properly assess the competition implications of 
its proposed remedies, the CMA became involved and had to act in favour of vulnerable 
groups who potentially fall outside its remit. This article focused on specific Ofgem 
interventions that impaired the outcome for vulnerable consumers and critically 
assessed selected remedies proposed by the CMA in a bid to show that they will most 
likely fail to invigorate competition to the benefit of consumers. CMA remedies focus 
on empowerment as the measurable act of switching and depict a mismatch between 
the competition mandate of the CMA and the regulatory nature of the said remedies. 
 The Commission’s and UK regulators’ approach is correct in advocating better 
information proliferation to consumers through, for example, the roll-out of smart 
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meters. Ultimately though this is a time consuming and on-going process and any 
measures adopted in the interim to protect vulnerable consumers should take account 
of the potential adverse effects on competition. They should also reflect on the 
underlying reasons triggering vulnerability. For example, as consumers progressively 
become more familiar with the respective conditions in liberalised retail energy 
markets, they will be more capable of assessing various offers. Information disclosure 
and consumer education coupled with competition gradually address market 
vulnerabilities. The emphasis should be placed on vulnerabilities caused by personal 
attributes, such as low income and for such vulnerabilities, a regulatory approach 
through the social welfare system or direct financial assistance is warranted. Such an 
approach is alien to the mandate of competition authorities and should be administered 
by sectoral regulators or the legislature, in consultation with the competition authority’s 
opinion on any adverse impact of the suggested measures on competition.  
 
Acknowledgments The author would like to thank Dr Despoina Mantzari, Professor Ariel Ezrachi, 
Professor Ioannis Kokkoris, Dr Julian Nowak, Mr Stylianos Alexandridis and the anonymous reviewers 
for their constructive comments on earlier drafts as well as Dr Andromachi Georgosouli and Dr Marek 
Martyniszyn and the participants at the following seminars, where earlier versions of this article were 
presented: “Energy markets: lessons from the UK experience”, New Voices in Commercial Law seminar 
series, Centre of Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary University of London, 5th November 2015; 
“Protecting and Empowering Consumers: lessons from the UK energy market investigation”, Queen’s 
University Belfast, 12th May 2016; SLS Annual Conference 2017, Energy Law Section, University 





ACER/ CEER. (2015). Annual report on the results of monitoring the internal electricity and natural  
gas markets in 2014. 
ACER/ CEER. (2016a). Annual report on the results of monitoring the internal electricity and gas  
markets in 2015 - key insights and recommendations. 
ACER/CEER. (2016b). Annual report on the results of monitoring the internal electricity and gas  
markets in 2015 - retail markets. 
Baldwin, R. (2014). From regulation to behaviour change: giving nudge the third degree. Modern Law  
Review, 77,  831-857. 





Bartl, M. (2010). The affordability of energy: How much protection for the vulnerable consumers?.   
Journal of Consumer Policy, 33, 225-245. 
Bartl, M. (2015). Internal market rationality, private law and the discretion of the Union: Resuscitating  
the market as the object of the political.  European Law Journal, 22, 572-598. 
Behavioural Insights Team. (2016). Applying behavioural insights to regulated markets. 
Caplovitz, D. (1967). The poor pay more. New York: The Free Press. 
Case C-382/87, R. Buet and Educational Business Services SARL v. Ministère public [1989] E.C.R. I- 
1235 
Case C-393/92, Municipality of Almelo and Others [1994] ECR I-1508 
 32 
Case C-159/94, Commission v France [1997] ECR I-5819  
Case C-210/96, Gut Springenheide GmbH, Rudolf Tusky v Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Steinfurt - Amt  
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